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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Ocean fish populations are a vital renewable resource for human populations, providing food, 
employment and recreation, as well as contributing to global biodiversity. Unfortunately, due to 
overfishing, environmental degradation, climate change and other stressors, many fish stocks worldwide 
are in considerable decline.  
 
Biological overfishing occurs when fishing rates exceed population growth rates. The resulting declines in 
fish populations can impact the economy at large. This study analyzes one important component of the 
costs of overfishing: forgone revenues from lost commercial fisheries harvests due to years of continued 
stock depletion, or historic overfishing. It estimates the present annual forgone revenue of overfishing for 
three regions in the United States: New England, the South Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico. These 
regions were chosen for analysis because they are grappling with the effects of historic overfishing and 
therefore have a significant number of overfished stocks. The 20 stocks included in this analysis are 
federally managed stocks particular to each region that are included in the Fish Stock Sustainability Index 
and are currently classified by the National Marine Fisheries Service as “overfished.” A stock that is 
classified as overfished is defined as having a biomass level below a biological threshold specified in its 
fishery management plan. 
 
Overfishing means fewer fish are available to catch in future years. The annual forgone revenue of 
historic overfishing, therefore, is an estimate of the value of lost catch in a given year due to overfishing. 
To arrive at the catch loss for each fishery, we first estimated the potential landings of each overfished 
stock as if it were at healthy levels, and compared those estimates directly to current landings values. We 
measured potential landings for each fish stock on the basis of optimal yield, and examined four 
approximations of optimal yield. Our estimates of commercial catch losses are for 2009, the most recent 
year for which all necessary data were available.  
 
Based on our estimates, the aggregate catch loss summed over all three regions in 2009 was $164.2 
million. Under a less-conservative approximation of optimal yield, commercial catch loss across all three 
regions in 2009 was estimated at $222.5 million. Across all three regions, we demonstrated that only 
20 to 29 percent of potential landings in 2009 were realized in actual landings. We found the 
commercial catch loss ($149 million) to be greatest in New England, where there are more overfished 
species than in any other region in the United States. In the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic regions, 
where large catch allocations are apportioned to recreational fishing, and therefore not accounted for in 
this analysis, commercial catch losses were lower but still significant. Commercial catch loss in the Gulf of 
Mexico and the South Atlantic regions were $12.3 million and $2.9 million, respectively.  
 
Our estimates of losses resulting from historic overfishing apply to commercial landings only, and do not 
account for the backward-linked economic impacts of commercial harvest, nor the forward-linked 
economic activity that would have resulted from the processing and retail sale of these potential catches. 
Additionally, there are further economic losses beyond the commercial sector in other industries, such as 
recreational fishing, and there are costs associated with negative impacts to food security, biodiversity 
and other ecosystem services that are not addressed in this analysis. Commercial catch losses are one 
significant component of the total economic costs of overfishing. Estimates of commercial catch loss we 
find in this study provide a strong economic argument in support of maintaining healthy fish populations 
and avoiding delays in rebuilding stocks currently subject to overfishing and/or classified as overfished. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Fish stocks are a vital resource to human populations. Not only are they a renewable resource, but they 
provide a variety of benefits including food and recreational pleasure, as well as supporting livelihoods. At 
present, however, pressures from illegal and/or unsustainable fishing, coupled with climate change, 
changing land-use patterns, population growth and other stressors, are contributing to declines in fish 
stocks. Fishing efforts globally have remained relatively constant with only slight increases, while the 
global production of marine fisheries has declined (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations [FAO], 2010). Many have declared this period from the latter half of the 20th century to the 
present as the most crucial stage in fishing history (Srinivasan et al., 2010 citing Grainger and Garcia, 
1996; Pauly et al., 2002; Myers and Worm, 2003; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Lotze et al., 
2006; Worm et al., 2006).  
 
Biological overfishing, the standard definition of overfishing, occurs when fishing depletes fish stocks 
faster than they can reproduce. Overfishing over time can result in consistent, substantial losses in 
commercial landings. Catch levels that exceed prescribed fishing levels can yield higher than sustainable 
profits in the short-term, but such harvesting eventually results in biologically overfished fisheries (i.e., 
fisheries that have a biomass level below a biological threshold specified in their fishery management 
plans). These fisheries are also economically inefficient because the extra effort required to locate and 
harvest catch can exceed the additional benefits. Economic overfishing occurs at a harvest rate that fails 
to maximize the long-term net sustainable rate of return from the fishery. The loss of ecosystem services 
resulting from fish stocks in decline further adds to the costs of overfishing. But a rebuilt, or never 
overfished, healthy fishery can provide abundant landings for the long-term.  
 
Several studies have demonstrated the potential economic benefits of maintaining or rebuilding healthy 
fish stocks. In a 2009 assessment of more than 200 stocks and stock complexes, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimated that rebuilding U.S. fish stocks would increase the 
current ex-vessel value by 54 percent annually, from $4.1 billion to $6.3 billion (NOAA, 2011). This 
potential increase could generate an additional $31 billion in sales and support an additional 500,000 jobs 
(Schwaab, 2011). Fully rebuilt U.S. fish populations in commercial and recreational fisheries could 
generate $216 billion in annual sales and support 2.5 million full- and part-time U.S. jobs.1
 
  
Examining a subset (17 stocks) of federally managed overfished stocks, Sumaila and Suatoni (2005) 
estimated that the combined net present value ($567 million) from rebuilding stocks according to their 
respective rebuilding plans would be three times greater than values derived from recent catch scenarios 
($194 million). Their estimates are derived from a partial valuation; they represent only a fraction of the 
total potential benefits associated with rebuilding federally managed overfished ocean fish stocks. 
 
Our study analyzes one component of the losses associated with overfishing: forgone revenues from lost 
commercial fishery harvests due to historic overfishing. It estimates the value of lost harvests in federally 
managed commercial fisheries that are currently classified as overfished in New England, the South 
Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico regions. The analysis, based on 2009 data, provides a snapshot of the 
potential losses from overfishing and the potential benefits of maintaining or rebuilding healthy fish 
populations that in turn will support commercial fisheries.  
 
2. PROJECT OVERVIEW 
This study answers the following question: What are the present annual forgone revenues due to historic 
overfishing? Overfishing means fewer fish are available for harvest in future years due to reduced 
population levels. The annual forgone revenue of historic overfishing, therefore, is an estimate of the 
value of the lost harvest in a given year due to years of stock depletion from overfishing. Our analysis 
targets federally managed commercial fisheries that have been classified as overfished in the New 
England, South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico regions. We provide estimates for a single year, 2009, the 
                                                     
1 These numbers are a summation of the estimated impacts of rebuilding from Schwaab (2011) and the comparable commercial and 
recreational estimates from NMFS (2008). 
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most recent year for which all necessary data were available, providing a snapshot in time, as compared 
with an analysis of the historic net present value of overfishing over a longer period.2
 
  
NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) reports annually to Congress on the status of fisheries 
under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) (Sec. 304[e][1]). In 
2009, 522 individual fish stocks and stock complexes were reviewed by NMFS (NMFS, 2010a). NMFS 
characterizes stocks as unknown, healthy, or “subject to overfishing” or “overfished.” A stock may be both 
subject to overfishing and overfished at the same time. Stock assessments are carried out often, although 
the frequency with which assessments occur varies by stock. 
 
According to NMFS, a stock is subject to overfishing if its fishing mortality rate exceeds the level that 
provides for maximum sustainable yield (MSY). MSY is considered the largest average catch that can be 
taken from a stock on a continuing basis under prevailing environmental conditions without impairing its 
long-term productivity. NMFS defines a stock that is overfished as having a biomass level below the 
biological threshold specified in its fishery management plan. A fishery management plan is a set of 
science-based recommendations aimed at achieving specified management goals for a fishery. When a 
stock is classified as overfished, the MSA requires fishery managers to take actions to rebuild stocks and 
implement a plan to end overfishing.  
 
NMFS measures progress in the management of national fisheries through the Fish Stock Sustainability 
Index (FSSI).The FSSI will increase if additional assessments are conducted, or if overfishing ends and 
stocks rebuild toward the level that provides MSY. Key stocks are selected for their importance to 
commercial and recreational fisheries. Since 2000, the index has increased nearly 60 percent (see Figure 
1).3
 
  
Figure 1. FSSI Score 2000-09  
 
 
Source: adapted from NMFS (2010a) 
 
In this study we targeted three of the eight fishery management council regions: New England, South 
Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico. These regions were chosen because they are grappling with the effects 
of historic overfishing and consequently have a significant amount of overfished stocks. For these three 
regions, we considered only fish stocks included in the FSSI and classified as overfished in the first 
quarter assessment report for the NMFS Status of U.S. Fisheries, 2011. Table 1 displays the 20 stocks 
included in our analysis by region. 
 
                                                     
2 The net present value of historical overfishing would represent the discounted net flow of both the short-term gains made in the 
initial years where landings exceeded sustainable rates and the longer-term losses due to dwindling populations.  
3 The maximum possible FSSI score is 920 points. The most recent FSSI score is 583, as reported in the first quarter update for 
2011, which also explains the scoring methodology (NMFS, 2011). To reach the maximum score would require the stock to grow 
roughly another 58%; however, there are 298 additional stocks that currently are not considered in the FSSI. The statuses of these 
additional stocks are largely “not defined,” “not applicable” or “unknown.” 
Year 
Index 
Score 
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Table 1. List of Targeted Stocks for This Study 
New England  South Atlantic 
1 Atlantic cod–Georges Bank  1 Black sea bass 
2 Atlantic halibut  2 Red grouper 
3 Ocean pout  3 Red porgy 
4 
 
White hake  4 Red snapper 
5 Windowpane–Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank  5 Snowy grouper 
6 Winter flounder–Georges Bank    
7 Winter flounder–Southern New England/Middle Atlantic  Gulf of Mexico 
8 Witch flounder–Northwestern Atlantic Coast  1 Gag 
9 Yellowtail flounder–Cape Cod/Gulf of Maine  2 Gray triggerfish 
10 Yellowtail flounder–Georges Bank  3 Greater amberjack 
11 Yellowtail flounder–Southern New England/Middle Atlantic  4 Red snapper 
 
All of the overfished stocks listed above are also classified as subject to overfishing, except Atlantic 
halibut, ocean pout and yellowtail flounder–Georges Bank in New England; and red porgy in the South 
Atlantic (NMFS, 2011).  
 
It is important to note that Table 1 is not a comprehensive list of all overfished stocks in each of the three 
regions. There are four additional overfished stocks in the New England region―smooth skate, thorny 
skate, Atlantic salmon and Atlantic wolffish. However, we could not find the necessary data for smooth 
and thorny skates,4
 
 and the latter two stocks are not FSSI stocks due to Atlantic salmon’s listing under 
the Endangered Species Act and Atlantic wolffish’s relatively lower commercial landings. It is conceivable 
that years of overfishing, combined with other factors, resulted in a significant decline of the commercial 
contribution of each of these stocks, precluding FSSI designation at the outset. More information 
regarding the tragedy of Atlantic salmon is presented in historical detail by Montgomery (2003). As for 
Atlantic wolffish, there are recent concerns that the stock may be rapidly headed toward extinction 
(Conservation Law Foundation, 2008).  
As of the beginning of 2011, there are two stocks in the New England region and four in the South 
Atlantic that are determined to be subject to overfishing but are not classified as overfished. These are: 
Atlantic cod–Gulf of Maine and windowpane–Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic in New England; and in 
the South Atlantic, gag, speckled hind, tilefish, vermillion snapper and Warsaw grouper. Additionally, 
three New England stocks are no longer classified as subject to overfishing or overfished but are still 
undergoing rebuilding efforts. These are Acadian redfish–Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank, American plaice–
Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank and barndoor skate–Georges Bank/Southern New England.  
 
In the South Atlantic region, pink shrimp are classified as overfished as outlined by the stock’s biological 
definition; however, the pink shrimp fishery is decidedly different from groundfish fisheries and will not be 
considered in this analysis.5
 
  
Beyond the stocks displayed in Table 1 and the aforementioned exceptions, there are no additional 
overfished fisheries in the three targeted regions; however, there are several FSSI and non-FSSI stocks 
for which overfished status is either unknown or undefined in New England (two), the South Atlantic (74) 
and the Gulf of Mexico (41). For a detailed list of these unknown or undefined stocks, please see 
                                                     
4 Smooth skates may no longer be designated as overfished, according to new survey data collected through 2010, although at this 
time thorny skates will probably remain classified as overfished (Thompson, 2011).  
5 The South Atlantic pink shrimp stock is officially considered an annual crop, eliminating the requirement of a rebuilding plan 
(NMFS, 2010b). The South Atlantic fishery management plan for shrimp states that with favorable environmental conditions, high 
fecundity enables pink shrimp to rebound from a very low population size to a high population size in a short period (SAFMC, 1996). 
The Shrimp Review Advisory Panel recently concluded that the parent stock was in decline, not because of overfishing but rather 
environmental and climatic factors (NMFS, 2010b). It would seem that if favorable environmental conditions keep the stock relatively 
impervious to crashing, then a decline due to environmental factors should require attention. 
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Appendix A. In the five council regions and the Highly Migratory Species management division outside 
the scope of this study, an additional total of 23 FSSI and non-FSSI stocks are classified as overfished as 
reported in the first quarter of 2011.  
 
3. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS 
To conduct our analysis, we first identified the fish stocks for which adequate data were available (see 
Section 2, Table 1). For each stock, we then assembled the following data: 
• Scientifically determined MSY reference points. 
• Enforced or proposed commercial vs. recreational allocations (where available). 
• Commercial price per pound in 2009. 
• Commercial landings (pounds) in 2009. 
Sources for these data are referenced in Table D.1 in Appendix D and consist of NMFS data, individual 
stock assessments, regional council documents and personal communication with council staff. All 
estimates are reported in 2009 dollars unless otherwise noted. 
 
To estimate catch losses from overfishing, we needed to compare the current commercial harvest level 
for each fishery to potential commercial landings if the fishery were not overfished. Potential landings 
could be estimated on the basis of optimal yield (OY) or MSY. The MSA (Section 3 [33] MSA, 2007) 
defines OY as the amount of fish that:  
(a) will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food 
production and recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of marine 
ecosystems;  
(b) is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from the fishery, as 
reduced by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor; and  
(c) in the case of an overfished fishery, provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with 
producing the maximum sustainable yield in such fishery.  
 
OY is typically found by determining the yield that corresponds to a given percentage decrease in the 
fishing rate that achieves the MSY of a healthy fish stock. The estimate of MSY is instrumental to 
determining OY, though the actual calculation of OY varies widely depending on biological, economic and 
social factors particular to the stock in question. There are often two types of OY estimates: a longer term 
“equilibrium OY,” based on the stock at healthy, equilibrium biomass levels; and shorter-term “rebuilding 
OY” set at low levels to facilitate successful rebuilding of overexploited fisheries with legally required 
rebuilding plans. Estimates of OY in the latter case are more like moving targets that would increase as 
the stock rebuilds.  
 
Many have debated the appropriateness of using MSY or OY as a management tool for fisheries 
(Roughgarden and Smith, 1996; Jennings et al., 2001; Heneman, 2002; Walters et al., 2005; Legovic et 
al., 2010). MSY, however, is still the most “readily understood and operational” concept within fisheries 
management (Mace, 2004). Potential landings based on MSY rather than OY are larger and, in our 
analysis, would lead to higher estimates of catch losses. We chose, however, to base our estimates of 
catch losses on OY, on the grounds that MSA requires fishery councils to set management levels at OY, 
since fishing directly at MSY is neither biologically nor economically optimal.6
 
  
As discussed, estimates of OY vary according to fish stock but are typically based on a reduction of the 
harvest rate associated with MSY. However, current equilibrium OY levels specific to each fish stock in 
                                                     
6 Economically, while it may appear initially that harvesting at the MSY would garner the largest profit, this is not necessarily true. A 
harvesting rate that is less than MSY, where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, is actually where economic rents are 
maximized (Christy and Scott, 1965). The economic rent is the difference between the value of the catch and the cost of that catch. 
Grafton, Kompass and Hilborn (2007) support a lower harvesting rate, too, showing that under reasonable prices, costs and 
discount rates, it is not economic to exploit fisheries to extinction and that an economically optimizing biomass is above that 
supporting MSY. 
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our analysis could not be determined, nor could we estimate them with the provided information; 
therefore, we estimated OY as a direct percentage of MSY.7
 
 Healthy fish stocks may have equilibrium OY 
levels that typically represent 70 to 100 percent of estimated MSY, while overfished stocks have 
rebuilding OY levels ranging from 0 to 100 percent of MSY depending on specific management plans and 
goals. Furthermore, some of the stocks in our analysis are currently assigned very low OYs under their 
respective rebuilding plans; higher OYs would apply if stocks were returned to the healthy equilibrium 
levels we assume for our catch loss analysis. For these reasons, our analysis assumes that potential 
landings based on OY represent 75 percent of potential landings based on MSY. We chose 75 percent of 
MSY as a conservative proxy for OY for each stock given that our catch loss estimates assume healthy 
stocks. The given equilibrium OY levels we did find for specific stocks in our analysis exceeded 75 
percent of MSY (see Appendix C), however, New England stock assessments indicate that the OY in the 
New England stocks may be closer to 75 percent. We recognize that 75 percent of MSY may not be the 
most accurate proxy for OY for each stock considered, and catch losses estimated based on alternative 
proxies of OY (65 percent, 85 percent and 95 percent of MSY) are also presented in this study.  
In our analysis, we did not assume that 100 percent of the OY would be allocated for commercial fishing. 
In the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico regions, where recreational fishing of many overfished species is 
popular, recreational fishing may have a larger economic impact than commercial fishing (Griffin et al., 
2009; Gentner, 2011). In these regions, we determined the commercial allocation percentages we applied 
in our analysis from official council decisions, where available, as referenced in Appendix D. Because the 
South Atlantic red snapper and red grouper fisheries had no previously designated allocations, we took 
as the commercial allocations the proportion of commercial landings to total landings reported by 
Southeast regional staff from 2009.8
 
 In New England, annual catch limits do not include a specific 
allocation between commercial and recreational harvesting. After consulting with New England Fishery 
Management Council representatives, we assumed that 100 percent of OY goes to the commercial 
fishing sector.  
To estimate catch loss from overfishing, we estimate the difference between maximum revenue 
obtainable from the fishery and the actual revenue obtained in 2009. The lost economic revenue for each 
stock (LERs) is calculated in four steps. First, the MSY (M) of that stock is multiplied by 75 percent to 
produce the proxy value of OY, which is then multiplied by the allocation (A) to commercial fishing, 
multiplied again by the current commercial price per pound (P) for that stock, minus the value of current 
commercial landings (PxL
 
). 
( ) ( )PLAPMLERs −= )75(.  
 
For a specific region (r) considered in the analysis, the estimate of lost economic revenue per region 
(LERr) can be calculated as the sum of the estimates of LERs for this region over all stocks (S) or:  
 
∑
∈
=
Ss
sr LERLER  
The estimated lost economic revenue (LERTOT) ) for all stocks ( Ss∈ ) considered in this analysis is 
therefore:  
 
∑∑∑
∈ ∈∈
==
Rr Ss
s
Rr
rTOT LERLERLER  
                                                     
7 We present the current OY levels used for stocks considered in this analysis (where available) in Appendix C. 
8 It is notable that in 2010, harvest of South Atlantic red snapper was prohibited for both commercial and recreational fishing sectors. 
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Using these calculations and the aforementioned assumptions, we conducted an analysis that compares 
the value of actual 2009 commercial landings with estimated commercial landings if the fisheries had not 
been overfished.9
 
 
4. RESULTS 
Results presented in this section and summarized in Table 2 assume OY levels that are equivalent to 75 
percent of MSY. In Section 4.2, we present a wider range of catch loss estimates based on alternative 
approximations of OY. In Section 5, we briefly discuss the broader economic implications of catch losses 
and overfishing. 
 
4.1. Forgone Landings—Direct Value 
Table 2 presents the results of our catch loss analysis for targeted stocks in each of the three study 
regions. The aggregate catch loss summed over all three regions in 2009 was estimated at $164.2 
million. Of all stocks and all regions, the New England Atlantic cod–Georges Bank fishery is estimated to 
have the largest single stock catch loss, estimated at $46.3 million in 2009. This is followed by the New 
England winter flounder–Georges Bank fishery and the New England Atlantic halibut fishery, both with 
estimated catch losses of approximately $26.5 million in 2009. The highest estimated catch loss in the 
South Atlantic in 2009 was the black sea bass at $1.2 million; in the Gulf of Mexico in 2009, the red 
snapper stock was the largest estimated catch loss at $10.3 million.  
 
The catch loss value for the New England region as a whole ($149 million) far exceeded the regional 
catch losses in the South Atlantic ($2.9 million) and Gulf of Mexico ($12.3 million). The New England 
region manages more stocks classified as overfished than any other region in the country. In addition, 
estimates of commercial catch losses in the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic may be smaller than in 
New England because of the large allocations to recreational fishing. In the South Atlantic and Gulf of 
Mexico regions, our analysis does not capture catch losses associated with recreational fishing.  
 
The last column in Table 2 displays the percentage of estimated potential landings realized by current 
landings. For example, in New England, winter flounder–Georges Bank landings were approximately $6.4 
million, compared with a $9.6 million estimated potential; thus, approximately 66 percent of potential 
landings were realized. This measure allows for interesting comparisons. In the New England region, for 
example, winter flounder–Georges Bank had the highest percentage of landings realized, though its catch 
loss was not the smallest. In New England, ocean pout and windowpane–Gulf of Maine/Georges Bank 
had the lowest percentage of landings realized, zero each, though again, their respective catch losses 
were among the smallest.  
 
Generally, current harvests in the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico seem to realize a greater portion of 
potential landings than those in New England. As mentioned previously, this is most likely affected by the 
different commercial allocations among the regions. The Gulf of Mexico gray triggerfish stands out with 
only 8 percent realized. 
 
The New England region overall had the lowest percentage of landings realized, 21 percent, compared 
with the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico totals of 57 and 48 percent, respectively. The sum total 
constitutes only 25 percent of potential landings over all stocks in all regions.  
                                                     
9 Commercial prices vary with landings. Healthier stocks and larger commercial landings typically lead to lower commercial prices, 
holding all other factors constant. Because our analysis was specific to 2009 landings, we applied 2009 commercial prices.  
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Table 2. Estimated Catch Loss by Region (2009) 
 
New England 
MSY  
(1000 lb 
lw) 
75% OY 
(1000 lb 
lw) 
% to 
com-
mercial 
Potential 
landings 
(1000 lb 
lw) 
Potential 
value  
(1000 $) 
2009 
$/lb 
Total 
landed  
(1000 
lb lw) 
Current 
value 
(1000 $) 
Estimated 
catch loss 
(1000 $) 
% 
value 
real-
ized 
Atlantic cod–GB 68,694 51,520 100% 51,520 $65,880 $1.28 15,340 $19,615 $46,265 30% 
Atlantic halibut 7,716 5,787 100% 5,787 $26,959 $4.66 99 $461 $26,499 2% 
Ocean pout 8,276 6,207 100% 6,207 $3,645 $0.59 0 $0 $3,645 0% 
White hake 12,787 9,590 100% 9,590 $9,232 $0.96 4,070 $3,918 $5,314 42% 
Windowpane–
GOM/GB 1,543 1,157 100% 1,157 $508 $0.44 4 $2 $507 0% 
Winter flounder–
GB 7,716 5,787 100% 5,787 $9,626 $1.66 3,823 $6,358 $3,267 66% 
Winter flounder–
SNE/MA 21,477 16,108 100% 16,108 $26,792 $1.66 172 $286 $26,506 1% 
Witch flounder–
NAC 5,185 3,889 100% 3,889 $7,512 $1.93 2,028 $3,918 $3,594 52% 
Yellowtail 
flounder–
CC/GOM 
3,792 2,844 100% 2,844 $3,814 $1.34 1,197 $1,606 $2,209 42% 
Yellowtail 
flounder–GB 20,723 15,543 100% 15,543 $20,846 $1.34 2,147 $2,880 $17,966 14% 
Yellowtail 
flounder–SNE/MA 13,448 10,086 100% 10,086 $13,528 $1.34 218 $293 $13,235 2% 
SUBTOTAL     $149,008 21% 
   
South Atlantic 
MSY  
(1000 lb 
ww) 
75% OY 
(1000 lb 
ww) 
% to 
commer
cial 
Potential 
landings 
(1000 lb 
ww) 
Potential 
value  
(1000 $) 
2009 
$/lb 
Total 
landed  
(1000 
lb ww) 
Current 
value 
(1000 $) 
Estimated 
catch loss 
(1000 $) 
% 
value 
realiz
ed  
Black sea bass 2,778 2,083 43% 896 $1,994 $2.23 363 $808 $1,185 41% 
Red grouper 1,110 833 60% 500 $1,372 $2.75 431 $1,183 $189 86% 
Red porgy 626 469 50% 235 $342 $1.46 165 $240 $102 70% 
Red snapper 2,431 1,823 35% 638 $2,289 $3.59 362 $1,298 $991 57% 
Snowy grouper 313 235 95% 223 $674 $3.02 89 $270 $404 40% 
SUBTOTAL     $2,872 57% 
   
Gulf of Mexico 
MSY  
(1000 lb 
ww) 
75% OY 
(1000 w 
lb ww) 
% to 
commer
cial 
Potential 
landings 
(1000 lb 
ww) 
Potential 
value  
(1000 $) 
2009 
$/LB 
Total 
landed  
(1000 
lb ww) 
Current 
value 
(1000 $) 
Estimated 
catch loss 
(1000 $) 
% 
value 
realiz
ed 
Gag 4,270 3,202 39% 1,249 $4,151 $3.32 843 $2,802 $1,350 67% 
Gray triggerfish 1,638 1,229 21% 258 $270 $1.05 19 $20 $249 8% 
Greater 
amberjack 5,039 3,779 27% 1,020 $1,059 $1.04 601 $624 $435 59% 
Red snapper 14,960 11,220 51% 5,722 $18,224 $3.18 2,500 $7,962 $10,262 44% 
SUBTOTAL     $12,296 48% 
 GRAND TOTAL     $164,176 25% 
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4.2. Alternate Assumptions—Direct Value 
The results in Table 2 closely align with current management practices; however, catch loss estimates are 
sensitive to changes in underlying assumptions about potential catches. In Table 3, we present three 
additional sets of estimates of commercial catch loss based on different assumptions about potential 
catch. In Scenario A, 95 percent of MSY is available for commercial fishing allocations. In Scenario B, 
potential catch is based on 85 percent of MSY as OY. In Scenario C, OY is equal to 75 percent of MSY; 
this is the scenario that produced the results in Section 4.1 and Table 2 above. Finally, in Scenario D, 
potential catch is based on a low estimate of OY; OY is equal to 65 percent of MSY. We apply the same 
commercial allocation percentages and prices across each scenario.  
 
Table 3. Estimated Catch Loss by Region Under Varied Scenarios (2009) 
 
 
Not surprisingly, estimates of catch losses are significantly higher (about $222.5 million) if we assume that 
a higher portion (95 percent) of MSY is available for commercial fishing allocations. As shown in 
Appendix C, this scenario may be more representative of management practices for the South Atlantic 
and Gulf of Mexico. Higher catch loss estimates do not indicate that fishery allocations should be made 
on these bases. The ecological and economic impacts associated with various management regimes 
have to be carefully considered and weighed (see Appendix B). 
 
These catch loss estimates imply that only small fractions of potential values are currently realized; only in 
three instances throughout all four scenarios (the South Atlantic in Scenarios C and D, and the Gulf of 
Mexico in Scenario D), do the current landings values realize more than half of estimated potential 
commercial values. It is important to note again that  there are additional losses incurred in the 
recreational fisheries in the Gulf and South Atlantic regions not accounted for here.  
 
The differences among catch loss estimates from the four scenarios are substantial, in total and by 
region. However, all four scenarios, from the least to most conservative assumptions, agree that 
approximately 71 to 80 percent of potential landings are currently not being realized due to historic 
overfishing. Furthermore, broader economic impacts of overfishing should not be overlooked, such as 
associated economic losses in backward- and forward-linked industries (see Appendix E for a brief 
discussion on this and overfished stocks globally).  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The losses resulting from historic overfishing are significant. We analyzed 2009 estimated catch losses to 
commercial fisheries in the New England ($149 million), South Atlantic ($2.9 million) and Gulf of Mexico 
($12.3 million) regions. The aggregate catch loss summed over all three regions in 2009 was estimated at 
$164.2 million, but could be as high as $222.5 million under less-conservative assumptions about 
potential catch size.  
 
Catch loss estimates are based on forgone gross revenues from landings of overfished stocks as 
compared to landings values of these stocks at healthy levels. They do not account for forgone benefits 
from other potential economic activity in industries related to commercial harvesting, such as bait and 
Scenarios 
New England South Atlantic Gulf of Mexico GRAND TOTAL 
Catch 
 loss  
% value 
realized 
Catch 
 loss  
% value 
realized 
Catch 
 loss  
% value 
realized 
Catch 
 loss  
% value 
realized 
A. 95% of MSY to be respectively 
allocated to commercial fisheries  
$199.2 
million 16% 
$4.7 
million 45% 
$18.6 
million 38% 
$222.5 
million 20% 
B. 85% of MSY to be respectively 
allocated to commercial fisheries 
$174.1 
million 18% 
$3.8 
million 50% 
$15.5 
million 42% 
$193.3 
million 22% 
C. 75% of MSY to be respectively 
allocated to commercial fisheries 
$149.0 
million 21% 
$2.9 
million 57% 
$12.3 
million 48% 
$164.2 
million 25% 
D. 65% of MSY to be respectively 
allocated to commercial fisheries 
$123.9 
million 24% 
$2.0 
million 66% 
$9.1 
million 56% 
$135.0 
million 29% 
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tackle shops, commercial processing, seafood retail and throughout the economy at large. Overfishing 
also contributes to losses in other industries, such as recreational fishing, which this study did not 
capture. Finally, overfishing leads to critical losses in biodiversity, ecosystem services, and food security, 
the sum total impact of which may well exceed the value of lost output by commercial fisheries.  
 
Catch losses are but one important component of the total economic costs of overfishing. Nevertheless, 
the estimates of catch loss provided by this study provide a strong economic argument in support of 
maintaining healthy ocean fish populations and continuing efforts to rebuild stocks currently subject to 
overfishing or classified as overfished.  
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APPENDIX A: List of Stocks with Overfished Status Unknown or Undefined10
If definitions exist but do not apply to certain stocks or are not available, the stock is listed as undefined. If 
there is no basis for making a determination, the stock is listed as unknown.  
 
                                                     
10 Summary of Stock Status for FSSI and Non-FSSI Stocks—Fourth Quarter 2010 (NMFS, 2010b) 
New England FSSI Stock? Overfishing?  Overfished? 
 
Red deepsea crab–Northwestern Atlantic Yes No Unknown 
 
Winter flounder–Gulf of Maine Yes Unknown Unknown 
South Atlantic 
   
 
Gray triggerfish Yes No Unknown 
 
Hogfish Yes Unknown Unknown 
 
Scamp Yes No Unknown 
 
Speckled hind Yes Yes Unknown 
 
Warsaw grouper Yes Yes Unknown 
 
White grunt Yes No Unknown 
 
Wreckfish Yes No Unknown 
 
Little tunny–Gulf of Mexico Yes No Undefined 
 
Goliath grouper–Southern Atlantic Coast /Gulf of Mexico Yes No Unknown 
 
Caribbean spiny lobster–Southern Atlantic Coast /Gulf of 
Mexico Yes No Unknown 
 
Black corals (Antipatharia) No No Undefined 
 
Fire corals (Milleporidae) No No Undefined 
 
Hydrocorals (Stylasteridae) No No Undefined 
 
Soft corals (Octocorallia) No No Undefined 
 
Stony corals (Scleractinia) No No Undefined 
 
Golden deepsea crab No Unknown Unknown 
 
Jonah crab No Undefined Undefined 
 
Red deepsea crab No Undefined Undefined 
 
Almaco jack No Unknown Unknown 
 
Atlantic spadefish No Unknown Unknown 
 
Banded rudderfish No Unknown Unknown 
 
Bank sea bass No Unknown Unknown 
 
Bar jack No Unknown Unknown 
 
Black margate No Unknown Unknown 
 
Black snapper No Unknown Unknown 
 
Blackfin snapper No Unknown Unknown 
 
Blue runner No Unknown Unknown 
 
Blueline tilefish No Unknown Unknown 
 
Bluestriped grunt No Unknown Unknown 
 
Coney No Unknown Unknown 
 
Cottonwick No Unknown Unknown 
 
Crevalle jack No Unknown Unknown 
 
Cubera snapper No Unknown Unknown 
 
Dog snapper No Unknown Unknown 
 
French grunt No Unknown Unknown 
 
Grass porgy No Unknown Unknown 
 
Gray snapper No No Unknown 
 
Graysby No Unknown Unknown 
 
Jolthead porgy No Unknown Unknown 
 
Knobbed porgy No Unknown Unknown 
 
Lane snapper No No Unknown 
 
Lesser amberjack No Unknown Unknown 
 
Longspine porgy No Unknown Unknown 
 
Mahogany snapper No Unknown Unknown 
 
Margate No Unknown Unknown 
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Misty grouper No Unknown Unknown 
 
Nassau grouper No No Unknown 
 
Ocean triggerfish No Unknown Unknown 
 
Porkfish No Unknown Unknown 
 
Puddingwife No Unknown Unknown 
 
Queen snapper No Unknown Unknown 
 
Queen triggerfish No Unknown Unknown 
 
Red hind No Unknown Unknown 
 
Rock hind No Unknown Unknown 
 
Rock sea bass No Unknown Unknown 
 
Sailors choice No Unknown Unknown 
 
Sand tilefish No Unknown Unknown 
 
Saucereye porgy No Unknown Unknown 
 
Schoolmaster No Unknown Unknown 
 
Scup No Unknown Unknown 
 
Sheepshead No Unknown Unknown 
 
Silk snapper No Unknown Unknown 
 
Smallmouth grunt No Unknown Unknown 
 
Spanish grunt No Unknown Unknown 
 
Tiger grouper No Unknown Unknown 
 
Tomtate No Unknown Unknown 
 
Whitebone porgy No Unknown Unknown 
 
Yellow jack No Unknown Unknown 
 
Yellowedge grouper No No Unknown 
 
Yellowfin grouper No Unknown Unknown 
 
Yellowmouth grouper No Unknown Unknown 
 
Wahoo No Unknown Unknown 
 
Cero–Southern Atlantic Coast/Gulf of Mexico No Unknown Unknown 
 
Ridged slipper lobster–Gulf of Mexico No Undefined Undefined 
Gulf of Mexico 
   
 
Red drum Yes No Undefined 
 
Hogfish Yes Unknown Undefined 
 
Nassau grouper Yes No Undefined 
 
Snowy grouper Yes Unknown Undefined 
 
Yellowedge grouper Yes Unknown Undefined 
 
Stone crabs (Menippe spp.) Yes No Undefined 
 
Bluefish No Unknown Unknown 
 
Black corals (Antipatharia) No No Undefined 
 
Fire corals (Milleporidae) No No Undefined 
 
Hydrocorals (Stylasteridae) No No Undefined 
 
Soft corals (Octocorallia) No No Undefined 
 
Stony corals (Scleractinia) No No Undefined 
 
Almaco jack No Unknown Undefined 
 
Anchor tilefish No Unknown Undefined 
 
Banded rudderfish No Unknown Undefined 
 
Blackfin snapper No Unknown Undefined 
 
Blackline tilefish No Unknown Undefined 
 
Blueline tilefish No Unknown Undefined 
 
Cubera snapper No Unknown Undefined 
 
Dog snapper No Unknown Undefined 
 
Dwarf sand perch No Unknown Undefined 
 
Goldface tilefish No Unknown Undefined 
 
Gray snapper No Unknown Undefined 
 
Lane snapper No Unknown Undefined 
 
Lesser amberjack No Unknown Undefined 
 
Mahogany snapper No Unknown Undefined 
 
Misty grouper No Unknown Undefined 
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Queen snapper No Unknown Undefined 
 
Red hind No Unknown Undefined 
 
Rock hind No Unknown Undefined 
 
Sand perch No Unknown Undefined 
 
Scamp No Unknown Undefined 
 
Schoolmaster No Unknown Undefined 
 
Silk snapper No Unknown Undefined 
 
Speckled hind No Unknown Undefined 
 
Tilefish No Unknown Undefined 
 
Warsaw grouper No Unknown Undefined 
 
Wenchman No Unknown Undefined 
 
Yellowfin grouper No Unknown Undefined 
 
Yellowmouth grouper No Unknown Undefined 
 
Seabob No Unknown Undefined 
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APPENDIX B: MSY and OY 
Maximum sustainable yield (MSY) is the absolute maximum number of fish that can be removed from the 
ecosystem at a rate that leaves the existing stock size the ability to replace the removal. It has been 
argued by many, however, that harvesting at the rate associated with MSY is not the most biologically or 
economically optimal rate. 
 
MSY has been the standard reference point in fishery management for more than five decades and 
continues to be so today, despite calls since the late 1970s to change it (Larkin 1977, for an example). 
May et al. (1979) highlight the need to recognize the important interactions among species as opposed to 
the single-species focus of calculating MSY. These concerns are still present in recent literature. 
Heneman (2002) points out the inherent contradiction between “maximum” and “sustainable” within MSY 
and calls for a completely new fisheries management model. Walters et al. (2005) and Legovic et al. 
(2010) fear that the reliance on MSY will ultimately result in the extinction of a large number of fish 
species due to the inability of MSY-based management methods to account for the large degree of 
complex interdependence between species in marine ecosystems.  
 
MSY continues, however, to be defended and utilized in management practices. Despite falling out of 
favor for a while in the 1980s after heavy criticism, the MSY concept underwent a sort of reincarnation, 
bringing it back to the forefront of current fisheries management (Mace, 2001; Punt and Smith, 2001). 
While MSY had been described as a target harvest level to achieve, it is now seen more as an absolute 
harvest limit, which if surpassed may result in overfishing. In fact, the term overfishing limit is used more 
and more in recent stock assessments and official NOAA/NMFS documents, directly defined as 
corresponding to MSY. For a more thorough review of the controversy over MSY, see Punt and Smith 
(2001). 
 
There are always uncertainties in MSY calculations and risks of unforeseen shocks to the fishery 
populations such as natural and man-made disasters and unpredictable levels of illegal or unregulated 
catch, among others. Biological models show that any reduction in the population corresponding with 
MSY for any reason will crash the stock, driving it to extinction; harvesting just below MSY at an 
economically favorable rate that corresponds with a smaller population size is also viewed as ecologically 
unstable and may result in a feedback loop that ultimately drives the stock to extinction (Roughgarden 
and Smith, 1996; Jennings et al., 2001). Therefore, ecologists and biologists strongly advocate a 
harvesting rate below MSY, implying a larger corresponding population size (Milner-Gulland and Mace, 
1998). These arguments additionally demonstrate that over time, harvesting at the prescribed rates below 
MSY maximizes long-term revenue in an uncertain and variable environment (Roughgarden and Smith, 
1996).  
 
While many uncertainties are still inherent in the calculation and utilization of MSY, it is the most  “readily 
understood and operational” concept within fisheries management overall (Mace, 2004). But in 
consideration of the varied, serious concerns about MSY-based management, safeguards have been put 
in place, such as requiring fishery managers to plan and operate using OY statistics and the mandate of 
implementing annual catch limits, which are required to be significantly less than the estimates of MSY. 
 
Economically, while it may appear initially that harvesting at the MSY would garner the largest profit, this 
is not necessarily true. A harvesting rate that is less than MSY, where marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost, is actually where economic rents are maximized (Christy and Scott, 1965). The economic rent is the 
difference between the value of the catch and the cost of that catch. Grafton, Kompass and Hilborn 
(2007) support a lower harvesting rate, too, showing that under reasonable prices, costs and discount 
rates, it is not economically efficient to exploit fisheries to extinction and that an economically optimizing 
biomass is above that supporting MSY.  
 
Economic overfishing occurs at a harvest rate that does not maximize the long-term net sustainable rate 
of return from the fishery. This “economic overfishing” can result in a higher level of effort for a smaller 
stock size. Many economists recommend operating commercial fisheries at a lower level of fishing effort. 
Lowering fishing effort, however, is not necessarily the same as decreasing fishing costs. Lower 
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aggregate fishing costs, from favorable subsidies or technological innovation, may increase fishing effort 
and may encourage economic and biological overfishing (Arnason et al., 2009).  
 
Preventing the overexploitation of fish stocks is the goal of considerable fisheries regulations and 
management. The aforementioned issues of uncertainty, risk, ecological equilibriums and maximizing 
consistent economic efficiency have led the MSA to legally require fishery management and harvesting 
allowances at levels of OY, as opposed to MSY. OY is legally defined as the amount of fish that:  
(a) will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food 
production and recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of marine 
ecosystems;  
(b) is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from the fishery, as 
reduced by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor; and  
(c) in the case of an overfished fishery, provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with 
producing the maximum sustainable yield in such fishery.  
  (Section 3 [33] MSA, 2007) 
 
OY is typically found by determining the yield that corresponds to a given percentage decrease in the 
fishing rate that achieves the MSY of a healthy fish stock. The estimate of MSY is instrumental in 
determining OY, though the actual calculation of OY varies widely depending on a stock’s biological, 
economic and social factors. There are often two types of OY estimates: 1) a longer-term “equilibrium 
OY,” based on the stock at healthy, equilibrium biomass levels; and 2) shorter-term “rebuilding OY” set 
specifically at low levels to facilitate successful rebuilding of overexploited fisheries with legally required 
rebuilding plans. Estimates of OY in the latter case are more like moving targets that would be expected 
to increase as the stock rebuilds.  
 
This lower allowable harvest at OY as compared to MSY corresponds with a higher biomass level. 
Framed within a broader ecosystem approach, OY may better satisfy both biological sustainability and 
economic rent-maximizing objectives.  
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APPENDIX C: Current OY Levels 
Table C.1 displays currently determined levels of OY for the stocks considered in this analysis, and the 
percentage of MSY the OY level constitutes. As discussed, estimates of OY vary according to fish stock 
but are typically based on a reduction of the harvest rate associated with MSY. However, current 
equilibrium OY levels specific to each fish stock in our analysis could not be determined, nor could we 
estimate them with the provided information; therefore, we estimated OY as a direct percentage of MSY.  
 
 
Table C.1. Current Optimum Yield Values 
 
South Atlantic 
MSY  
(ww lb.) 
OY  
(ww lb.) OY % of MSY 
Black sea bass 2,777,825 2,742,551 98.7% 
Red grouper 1,110,000 1,064,000 95.9% 
Red porgy 625,699 587,901 94.0% 
Red snapper 2,431,000 2,425,000 99.8% 
Snowy grouper 313,056 303,871 97.1% 
        
Gulf of Mexico 
MSY  
(ww lb.) 
OY  
(ww lb.) OY % of MSY 
Gag 4,269,960 4,170,000 97.7% 
Gray triggerfish* 1,638,000 567,000* 34.6%* 
Greater amberjack* 5,039,000 1,870,000* 37.1%* 
Red snapper 14,960,000 13,350,000 89.2% 
* OY for these species are not an equilibrium OY level; they have specifically been set low to achieve 
rebuilding goals. 
Sources for OYs: Respective Stock Assessments, SAFMC Amendments 15A (2007)  
and 17A (2010), and GMFMC Amendment 30A (2008) 
 
 
New England stock assessments indicate that the OY for New England stocks may represent a lower 
percentage of MSY than the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico stocks. We recognize that taking a set 
percentage (75 percent, as presented in the main analysis) of MSY to estimate OY may not be the most 
accurate proxy for OY for each stock considered, and catch losses estimated based on alternative 
proxies of OY (65 percent, 85 percent and 95 percent of MSY) are also presented in this study. 
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APPENDIX D: Data Source Reference Table by Stock 
 
Table D.1. Data Sources by Stock 
New England Source MSY % to Commercial Fisheries 2009$/LB Total Landed  
Atlantic cod–GB NEFMC Amendment 16 2009 NEFMC Framework Adjustment 44 2010 NMFS 2009 Northeast Preliminary Fisheries Statistics, NMFS 2010c 
Atlantic halibut NEFMC Amendment 16 2009 NEFMC Framework Adjustment 44 2010 NMFS 2009 NMFS 2009 
Ocean pout NEFMC Amendment 16 2009 NEFMC Framework Adjustment 44 2010 NMFS 2009 Northeast Preliminary Fisheries Statistics, NMFS 2010c 
White hake NEFMC Amendment 16 2009 NEFMC Framework Adjustment 44 2010 NMFS 2009 Northeast Preliminary Fisheries Statistics, NMFS 2010c 
Windowpane–GOM/GB NEFMC Amendment 16 2009 NEFMC Framework Adjustment 44 2010 NMFS 2009 Northeast Preliminary Fisheries Statistics, NMFS 2010c 
Winter flounder–GB NEFMC Amendment 16 2009 NEFMC Framework Adjustment 44 2010 NMFS 2009 Northeast Preliminary Fisheries Statistics, NMFS 2010c 
Winter flounder–SNE/MA NEFMC Amendment 16 2009 NEFMC Framework Adjustment 44 2010 NMFS 2009 Northeast Preliminary Fisheries Statistics, NMFS 2010c 
Witch flounder NEFMC Amendment 16 2009 NEFMC Framework Adjustment 44 2010 NMFS 2009 Northeast Preliminary Fisheries Statistics, NMFS 2010c 
Yellowtail flounder–CC/GOM NEFMC Amendment 16 2009 NEFMC Framework Adjustment 44 2010 NMFS 2009 Northeast Preliminary Fisheries Statistics, NMFS 2010c 
Yellowtail flounder–GB NEFMC Amendment 16 2009 NEFMC Framework Adjustment 44 2010 NMFS 2009 Northeast Preliminary Fisheries Statistics, NMFS 2010c 
Yellowtail Flounder–SNE/MA NEFMC Amendment 16 2009 NEFMC Framework Adjustment 44 2010 NMFS 2009 Northeast Preliminary Fisheries Statistics, NMFS 2010c 
South Atlantic 
    Black sea bass SEDAR SAR 2005 SAFMC Amendment 17B 2010b NMFS 2009 pers comm. Jack McGovern 2/21/12 
Red grouper SEDAR 19 SAR 2010 % to commercial over total landed 2009 NMFS 2009 pers comm. Jack McGovern 2/21/12 
Red porgy SEDAR SAR 2006a SAFMC Amendment 15B 2008 NMFS 2009 pers comm. Jack McGovern 2/21/12 
Red snapper SAFMC Amendment 17A 2010a % to commercial over total landed 2009 NMFS 2009 SAFMC Amendment 17A 2010a 
Snowy grouper SEDAR 4 SAR 1 2004 SAFMC Amendment 17B 2010b NMFS 2009 pers comm. Jack McGovern 2/21/12 
Gulf of Mexico 
    Gag SEDAR SAR 2007 pers comm. Jack McGovern 2/21/11 NMFS 2009 pers comm. Jack McGovern 2/21/12 
Gray triggerfish SEDAR 9 SAR 1 2006c pers comm. Jack McGovern 2/21/11 NMFS 2009 pers comm. Jack McGovern 2/21/12 
Greater amberjack SEDAR 9 SAR 2 2006b pers comm. Jack McGovern 2/21/11 NMFS 2009 pers comm. Jack McGovern 2/21/12 
Red snapper SEDAR SAR 2009 pers comm. Jack McGovern 2/21/11 NMFS 2009 pers comm. Jack McGovern 2/21/12 
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APPENDIX E: Broader Economic Impacts of Overfishing 
Beyond the value lost in direct commercial landings due to overfishing, there are associated losses in 
both “backward” and “forward” linkages in the respective supply chains. Backward links refer to the labor, 
gear and other operating suppliers that support commercial fishing efforts. Forward links refer to the 
processing, wholesale and retail industries that purchase and add value to commercial landings harvests. 
The economic value of commercial landings contributes to additional indirect and induced effects in 
backward-linked industries. Indirect effects refer to the money spent by commercial fishermen on bait, 
gear, fuel, equipment maintenance and related operating costs that support commercial fishing efforts. 
Induced effects represent the boost to the economy provided by the overall spending by fishermen, their 
crews and the employees of the indirect industries, made possible by the earnings from commercial 
landings. The value of indirect and induced effects are typically determined using economic multipliers. 
Multipliers appropriate to these fish stocks and these regions could be applied to our estimates of catch 
losses to derive a fuller estimate of the economic impacts of historic overfishing in these regions.  
 
Catch losses due to historic overfishing result in additional economic losses at forward links in the value 
chain beyond commercial harvesting. NMFS produces an annual fisheries statistics report that includes 
an economic value-added model for commercial fisheries (NMFS, 2009). The model calculates the value 
added at each forward step in the value chain, beginning with commercial harvest and ending at the point 
of final sale to consumers, thus estimating the total direct economic impact of the commercial fishing 
industry on the U.S. economy. Thus, our catch loss estimates at the harvesting level imply further losses 
in seafood processing and retail as well.  
 
Catch losses in the New England, South Atlantic and Gulf Coast regions are perhaps best understood in 
the context of overexploited, depleted or recovering fish stocks worldwide. Globally, the proportion of fish 
stocks identified as overexploited, depleted or recovering has more than tripled, from 10 percent in 1974 
to 32 percent in 2008 (FAO, 2010) (see Figure 2). Fully exploited stocks remain moderately consistent, 
while under- or moderately exploited stocks fell from 40 percent of the assessed stocks in 1974 to 15 
percent in 2008, the lowest percentage yet recorded (FAO, 2010). The FAO terms “overexploited” and 
“depleted” roughly correspond with the NMFS terms “overfished” or “subject to overfishing” used 
throughout this report.  
 
Figure 2. FAO Assessed Global Stocks Percentage Breakdown 
 
 
The lost economic benefits from overharvesting global marine fisheries are estimated to be about $50 
billion annually, or a cumulative $2 trillion over the past three decades, as published in a recent World 
Bank report on the economic justification for fisheries reform (Arnason et al., 2009). These losses 
represent the difference between the estimated potential and the actual net economic benefits from global 
marine fisheries; the annual estimate of $50 billion is likely to be a conservative estimate. It includes only 
the direct value of commercial landings and excludes losses to recreational fisheries, marine tourism, 
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fishery-dependent industries and global biodiversity, and does not consider the losses attributable to 
illegal fishing or compromise of the ocean carbon cycle. Thus, it is very likely that global economic losses 
from unsustainable exploitation of fish stocks substantially exceed $50 billion a year.  
 
In addition, Arnason et al. (2009) identify massive overcapacity in the global fishing fleet and harmful 
subsidies resulting in stagnant productivity, severe economic inefficiency and fishery resource stocks 
performing well below their economic optimums. Economically healthy fisheries require biologically 
healthy fish stocks. To begin to address these issues and start on a path of economic recovery, the World 
Bank report recommends a serious decrease in global fish mortality and dedicated rebuilding of fish 
stocks. 
 
Global marine catch losses from overfishing directly affect global food insecurity. Srinivasan et al. (2010) 
examined 11,804 fish stocks and estimated global potential catch losses due to historic overfishing. They 
then estimated levels of undernourishment that could have been avoided had the catch losses been 
realized. The results from their midlevel scenario suggested that in 2000, approximately 20 million people 
could have avoided undernourishment had fisheries not been overfished (Srinivasan et al., 2010). The 
authors estimated potential catch losses by utilizing MSY levels, from which they subtracted actual 
recorded catch. Final results were summed over stocks, over years (1954−2004) to determine total global 
catch loss estimates, which were then converted into potential food energy amounts to determine 
country-specific estimates of the number of people for whom sustainable fishing might have alleviated 
hunger. The study of Srinivasan et al. (2010) is unique in its approach to analyzing the consequences of 
overfishing in the direct context of food security. They astutely remind us that fisheries are worth more 
than the economic output produced by commercial fishing. 
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